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JUDICIAL SOLICITUDE FOR ASSASSINS OF
AGNOSTICS*
By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver Bar
OURTS have held inadmissible the dying declarations
of persons not believing in supernatural punishments.'
Since even the Supreme Court of the United States, as
if having religious "predilections," solemnly declared that
such statements "may be discredited by proof" that the dying
declarant "did not believe in a future state of rewards and
punishments,"' it is still timely to note the actual and possible
applications of the surviving mediaeval rule indicated at the
outset of this paper, and also of the one last mentioned.
Two thugs were once indicted for the murder of a fouryear-old girl. Shortly before dying, the child made a statement to her mother as to the manner in which she had been
assaulted by the accused. The declaration was not admitted
in evidence. The judicial excuse for the rejection was that
the child was too young to have "had any idea of a future
state." '
No other reason was suggested why the infant might
not have told the truth as to the identity and conduct of her
assailants. The court would have made a like ruling if the
victim had been of mature years and had previously expressed
a lack of belief in heaven or hell. It was, and still is, immaterial whether the skepticism results from an infant's immaturity or an adult's reasoning.
If it is possible for a distracted mother to witness a judicial farce in which the murderers of her child are freed because
the procedure becomes deflected by theological considerations,
it is probable that bereaved children may be compelled to see
unwarranted acquittals of brutal killers of their elders.
Suppose that a citizen who disbelieves in the doctrine of
divine wrath is murdered in cold blood by a fiend who professes orthodox beliefs, and that thereafter a young son of the
victim is present at the trial of the assassin. Assume that it is
known that the deceased while still alive and conscious of impending death named the defendant as the one who inflicted
the lethal blows. The dying declaration is offered in evidence,
*Revision of article in The Truth Seeker (N. Y.) as reprinted in The Lawyer
(Brooklyn, N. Y., June, 1938).
'Swancara, Obstruction of Justice by Religion, 131-147 (W. H. Courtright Pub.
Co., Denver, 1935).
'Carver v. United States. 164 U. S. 694, 697.
'Rex v. Pike, 3 Carr. I P. 598.
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but defense counsel vociferously claims to have proof that the
victim did not believe "in God and a future state of rewards
and punishments." 4
Naturally the boy's innumerable memories of his paternal companion are revived, and he recalls every incident prior
to the end of the funeral. He thinks of his parent's honesty
and truthfulness. He is entirely unprepared to listen to judicial and forensic expressions which assail the character, reputation, or veracity of his father.
After defense counsel shows that a dying declaration
occupies the same position as a living witness with respect to
admissibility and credibility, a court opinion is then adduced
in support of the libel that an unbeliever in hell "is unworthy
of any credit in a court of justice." 5 The boy is compelled to
hear the same shyster also read that an unbeliever in eternal
damnation or in any Deity prescribing it "shows a recklessness
of moral character and utter want of moral sensibility, such
as very little entitles him to be believed." 6 A church-affiliated
trial judge indicates an agreement with, and approval of, such
court opinions, and the grieving son concludes that the Christian on the bench is foully caluminating the dead. If the criminal trial takes place in a small and pious town, it is attended
by numerous spectators. The judge's remarks are heard with
great respect, and gossips proceed to repeat, with additions,
such expressions, construing them in a manner tending to
blacken the memory of the murderer's unoffending victim.
Naturally this circumstance greatly distresses the surviving
members of the latter's family.
During the trial it is possible that members of the bereaved group may hear court or counsel read from a law book
these words:'
"I have known a witness rejected, and hissed out of
court, who declared that he doubted of the existence of a God
and a future state."
If the filial listener is himself, like the late Clarence Darrow,
free of belief in divine vengeance, he will observe that the
'See Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463. affirmed in id. 601.
5
Norton v. Ladd, 4 N. H. 444.
"Odell v. Koppee, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 88.
'Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 97, 103; Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb.
(N.Y.) 265, 268.
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hisses alluded to were directed against the summoned and disinterested witness, not against the criminal, and he may rightly
conclude that if he himself attempts to testify against the killer
of his father he, the witness, may be "rejected and hissed out
of court," or if he is allowed to remain, hear it said that he "is
unworthy of any credit in a court of justice." The judicial
expressions are no messages of condolence in his hour of sorrow. Instead, these rules of evidence are more subservient to
the cruelty of a Herodias or a Torquemada than to fact finding, and add insult to the injury of children who have had
agnostic parents murdered.
When the dying declaration of a citizen is discredited by
proof of non-belief in hell, both the declarant and his testimony are discredited in the minds of some fundamentalist jurors, and the result is as if he were shown to have been convicted
of some infamous crime. It was an American (not an ancient
English) court that said:'
"* * * It (meaning unbelief in fundamentalist Christian
doctrines) can scarcely fail to deprive him of the esteem of
mankind, exclude him from intercourse with men of piety and
virtue, and render him odious and detestable."
A jury of fundamentalist believers in a religiously revived community, hearing the so-called impeaching evidence
and thereby learning that the victim of the killing was an
"infidel," might be disposed to acquit the murderer upon the
old ecclesiastical tenet that the destruction of a pagan, an apostate, or an unbeliever is as laudable a service to Christian society as is the extermination of noxious insects and rodents.'
What jury is anxious to convict a murderer, not known to
harbor any heresy, when it believes that his victim, now dead.
was, in the chaste language of a Connecticut Christian judge.
"Odious and detestable"? 0
The juridical rule in question, in addition to causing a
stigmatization of the victim's family, obviously aids a murderer to escape paying any penalty for the unjustifiable shedding of human blood. Besides affecting the credibility of the
dying declaration, the practice of permitting evidence of unbe'Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 325, 342.
"'All infidels are, in law, perpetual enemies, for between them, as with the Devil,
whose subjects they be, and the Christians, there is perpetual hostility, and can be no
peace." Lord Coke, as quoted in Hairn v. Bridalut, 37 Miss. 209, 226 (1859).
"Supra note 8.
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lief in theological dogmas on the part of the deceased helps the
criminal to "prove" self-defense. It is a favorite trick of killers to claim that the deceased was the aggressor. If when such
a defense is interposed the prosecution offers in evidence the
dying declaration of the victim and the defendant submits testimony, possibly perjured, that the declarant was a non-believer in a "future state," some of the jurors who have had
fundamentalist religious training in infancy may be induced
to believe that the deceased victim was the aggressor and that
the accused murderer did act in self-defense. The juror's reasoning would begin in accord with the following remarks of a
contributor to the Scottish Rite publication, New Age:"
"If the atheist recognizes no God and is, therefore, under
no compunctions about obeying Divine law, how much less
regard has he for man-made law?"
The juror might assume that because the deceased knew of no
"Divine law" he had an antipathy "for man-made law," and
probably assaulted the defendant, compelling the latter to act
in self-defense.
Most Christian judges are willing, without abhorrence,
to permit lack of belief in hell to affect either the competency
or the credibility of dying declarations. Recently the highest
court in Missouri not only upheld and applied the ancient rule
as to the impeachment of dying declarations, without regretting the supposed necessity for so doing, but attempted to
justify its ruling by the citation of precedents. So bold and
emphatic was the decision that the court saw fit to use italics
as follows:"2
"Dying declarations admitted in evidence may be discredited by showing that deceased was a disbeliever in a future state
of rewardsand punishment."
It ought not to be difficult for anyone to imagine the feelof
the family and friends of a murdered man when they
ings
see in their local newspaper the publication of an official opinion containing such a reference to the deceased. It was not the
murderer who was "discredited," nor was it any perjurer or
other felon, but the court meant that it was the aged and unoffending man, the victim of a brutal murder, who could be thus
stigmatized.
"lssue of November, 1928.
"State v. Rozell, 225 S. W. 931.

